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R.: Abstracts of Recent Cases

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
CONSTOmoNAL

LAw-WArvma

OF COuNSEL-CAPAcrrY

TO

WAivE.-Petitioner, a 17 year old of limited education and mental
capacity, without the aid of counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge
of murder and was sentenced to prison for life. Twelve years later
he filed a delayed motion for a new trial, asserting the constitutional
invalidity of his conviction and sentence because he did not have
the assistance of counsel at the time of his plea and sentence. The
motion was denied by the circuit court, and the supreme court of
Michigan affirmed. Moore v. Michigan, 344 Mich. 137, 73 N.W.2d
274 (1955). Petitioner then applied to the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Held, that as a
matter of due process, the petitioner, unless he intelligently waived
his constitutional right, was entitled to representation by counsel,
since the extent of the availability of various defenses and the
proceedings to determine the degree of murder raised difficult questions beyond his capacity to comprehend; and that he did not
intelligently and understandingly waive his right to counsel. Moore
v. Michigan, 91 S. Ct. 191 (1957).
The delay of twelve years presented no difficulty to the Court
in sustaining petitioner's motion for a new trial. The test applied,
and properly so, was whether the petitioner's waiver of counsel
was intelligently and understandingly made. If not, there was no
waiver. The defendant in such a case, however, once he has established his constitutional right to the benefit of counsel, must carry
the burden of proving nonwaiver by the preponderance of the
evidence that he did not intelligently and understandingly waive
his right to counsel. Thus, it would seem that a delay would only
affect the defendant by hindering him in the production of proof
in order for him to sustain the burden of showing nonwaiver. For
further discussion and cases see Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1949);
149 A.L.R. 1403 (1944); 93 L. ed. 140 (1950). See also Quicksall
v. Michigan,339 U.S. 660 (1949).

EviDENcE-GENEi.L

REPUTATION

OF

DisoiDERLY HOUSE

TO

ESTABLISH KNOWLEDGE ON PART OF DEFENDANT HELD ADMISSiBLE.-

D, lessor of a hotel, was found guilty of contempt for the violation
of an injunctive order restraining him from knowingly permitting
his hotel to be used as a common and public nuisance. The hotel
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was ordered padlocked and D was sentenced to six months in the
county jail. D appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia. Held, that the evidence was insufficient
to justify the finding that D was guilty of contempt, but for the
purpose of establishing "knowledge" on part of D evidence of the
general reputation of the hotel was properly admitted. State v.
Taft, 100 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1957).
The admission in evidence of the general reputation of a disorderly house to show knowledge of such is generally permissible
in jurisdictions having statutes making it unlawful to "knowingly"
permit one's premises to be used as a common and public nuisance.
Kahan v. Wallander, 83 N.Y.S.2d 570, 193 Misc. 190 (1948). For
further discussion and cases see 17 Am. Jun., Disorderly Houses §§
18-21, 35 (1957); 6 WIGMOBE, EVmENCE § 1789 (1940); 20 AM.
JuR., Evidence § 462 (1940).

PRoPERTY-JoiNr TENANCY-LANGUAGE

INTENDING TO CR ATE

Sumc=rl .- P instituted proceedings for partition of real
estate conveyed to his wife and himself by two separate deeds. One
deed granted real estate to the parties "for and during their natural
lives as joint tenants with remainder in fee to the survivor". The
other granted real estate to them "as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship". Circuit court held that the parties, being husband
and wife, took an estate by the entirety in the property and as such
it is not susceptible to partition. P appealed to the Supreme Court
of West Virginia. Held, that common law estates by entireties have
been abolished. The deeds created joint tenancies in the grantees,
vesting each with an undivided one-half interest in the property
conveyed, subject to the survivorship rights of each other. Partition
of the real estate conveyed is compellable. Wartenburg v. Wartenburg, 100 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1957).
HE=

In so holding the court has applied W. VA. CODE C. 1., art. 36,
§ 19 (Michie 1955), and indicated that the language in a conveyance stating "as joint tenants with the right of survivorship" is a
sufficient expression of intention in the conveying instrument to
create a joint tenancy, thereby relaxing somewhat the need for
stricter and more complete expression of such intention before a
joint tenancy can be created. For a full discussion see McNeeley
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v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 (1902). For further text and cases indicating language sufficient to create joint
tenancies see Annot., 161 A.L.R. 457 (1946); 85 A.L.R. 282 (1933).

WRONGFUL DEATH

TO SHrE

AwmW-AnoPTD CILuaE

NoT ENTLED
FAam.-

IN AWARD FOR WRONGFUL DFATH OF NATtUm.A

Decedent left a widow and four children, two by his first marriage.
The children of the first marriage had been adopted by the first
wife's present husband. The Illinois wrongful death statute provides that the wrongful death award shall be distributed on the
basis of dependency to the widow and the next of kin, in the proportion determined by the court. Held, that the children of the
first marriage, since they were not dependent upon the decedent
for their support, were not entitled to share in the distribution of
the wrongful death award. Rust v. Holland, 146 N.E.2d 82 (II.
1957).
Under the rule pronounced by the court it would be entirely
possible that children of a deceased person, who had reached
majority and were no longer directly dependent upon the deceased
for future support, even in the absence of other children dependent
upon the deceased, might be precluded from sharing in the wrongful death award. It is well to note, however, that the next of kin,
although not entitled to share in the wrongful death award, may
still share in the estate of the deceased in case of intestacy under
the statutes of descent and distribution. For a complete discussion
of distribution of wrongful death award see Annot., 112 A.L.R. 80
(1938); 14 A.L.R. 532 (1921); 16 Am. Jur., Death, § § 247-251
(1938).

J. L.R.
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